COP29 is over: What comes next?

Analysis

Between 11 and 22 November, Azerbaijan hosted the UN Climate Conference, COP29, with reportedly more than 55 thousand attendees, including governments, civil society, the tech industry, indigenous communities, and, reportedly, at least 1700 fossil fuel lobbyists. Deemed “finance COP,” the climate summit in Baku was supposed to determine the scope of financial contributions from developed countries for climate projects of the developing countries.

That COP29 was going to take place in Baku had already drawn significant criticism abroad, as fossil fuels are the lifeline of Azerbaijan’s economy, and the country does not tolerate any activism, including environmental. Unlike in previous COPs, many Western and non-Western leaders, including those of the United States, France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden, as well as Russia, China, India, and Iran, did not attend the summit in Baku.

Thus, president Aliyev’s opening speech at COP29 was not a usual one, as he took the stage to lambast Western governments for “double standards” and “political hypocrisy,” accusing them of modern colonialism and using their “state-controlled and fake news media” against Azerbaijan. He said Azerbaijan is not a “petrostate” and glorified oil and gas resources as “God’s gift” - once again. Following Aliyev’s furious remarks, France said it would retaliate, and the French energy minister canceled her COP29 trip to Baku. Belgium’s energy minister asserted that “… it's absolutely an abuse of the stage to do such things as the president, as the host to this COP.”

Azerbaijan’s presidency referred to COP29 as a success - however, for environmental groups, vulnerable nations, and developing countries like India and Nigeria, it ended with “disappointment and betrayal” because of the unsatisfactory final financial pledge. Canadian climate minister blamed Azerbaijan’s “deplorable presidency” in facilitating a more ambitious deal. The Azerbaijani presidency maintained that it was the Western countries’ negotiators who “stood in the way of a much better deal.”

Domestic context after COP29

As a host country until Brazil takes over mid-next year, Azerbaijan will stick to promoting its green agenda and resume building infrastructure for renewables. This also serves as a means for securing continued engagement with Western financial institutions, notably including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank.

Politically, however, Azerbaijan sticks to a trajectory toward full consolidation of personalist rule and eliminating the troublers thereof. Boosted international campaigns pushing for the release of the country’s political prisoners, including those arrested ahead of COP29 in another wave of far-reaching crackdown on the remnants of independent NGOs and media, did not yield any results, as the Azerbaijani elite remained persistent in either neglecting or backfiring on all the calls.

Just as COP29 ended, on 24 November, renowned political analyst and Political Management Institute NGO director, Azer Gasimli, was banned from traveling abroad at Baku airport. He was later interrogated in relation to the overarching criminal case against NGOs over alleged illegal financing from Western donors. Reprisals against the remaining independent groups and individual voices will likely continue following COP29 as the authorities seek to end any partnerships between domestic societal groups and Western organizations.

Political parties are another target. Main opposition leader, Popular Front Party chairman Ali Karimli, is facing a politically charged sham trial. “… the authorities want to completely liquidate the opposition,” Karimli said outside the courtroom. Two more members of the party were sentenced to administrative arrests on 29 November.

Economically, Azerbaijan continues to enjoy increased demand for natural gas in the European market. However, the country is seeing a depletion in both the production and export of crude oil – and natural gas revenues hardly offset this trend. In the first ten months of 2024, Azerbaijan’s revenues from oil exports amounted to 12.7 million USD, while gas exports worthed 6.8 million USD. Respectively, these numbers are 7.4 percent and 44 percent lower compared to the revenues in the same period of the last year. The inflow of hydrocarbon-related income still allows the authorities to stabilize national currency and the inflation rate (at 3.5 percent in 2024, per official data) – however, institutional challenges of diversifying the economy away from fossil fuels - prices of which are fluctuating – remain the key challenge.

East or West

COP29 heralded further deterioration in the relations between the European Union and Azerbaijan at the political level. Baku is now at odds even with the previously friendly EU members, such as Poland.

The adversity is not likely to fade as Azerbaijan shows no sign of willingness to return to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This could only be possible through at least window-dressing reforms in political life, such as the release of some notable political prisoners and ceasing the recent persecution of NGOs alongside a bold advancement in peace talks with Armenia. The question remains, however, whether the EU will accommodate the Aliyev government even with the current troubling record and strong anti-West rhetoric - and strive to improve its relations with the latter nonetheless, sticking to the business-as-usual scenario.

On the other hand, the Azerbaijani authorities seem to be inclined to improve their relations with the United States after the onset of the Trump administration. Azerbaijani government-linked think tanks contend that it is easier for the Azerbaijani elite to find a common language with the Republicans, particularly in the example of the previous Trump leadership. It is argued Azerbaijan could “play the Iran card and show strategic cooperation with Israel” to polish its standing vis-à-vis the US. Thus, the Azerbaijani government might continue its offensive on pro-Western societal actors domestically in December, later to make concessions with the US once Trump takes over the presidency.

Yet, chilled relations with the West lead to inevitable further rapprochement with Russia. In Baku in early October, the Russian intelligence chief Naryshkin discussed with his counterpart the bilateral cooperation to determine “hostile intentions of Western intelligence agencies, which are directed at undermining the internal political stability” of the two countries and “timely detection and prevention of subversive activities organized abroad with anti-Russian and anti-Azerbaijani aims." Particularly, Naryshkin noted the joint efforts to “counter the use of non-systemic opposition and international terrorist organizations by foreign intelligence agencies to destabilize the socio-political situation in Russia and Azerbaijan.”

Moreover, in summer 2024, Azerbaijan inked a strategic partnership agreement with China in the quest to enhance economic opportunities and Chinese investment, particularly in the Middle Corridor. Completion of this international transportation project is imperative for the Azerbaijani government to cement its regional importance, hence utilizing it as leverage in foreign relations.

Summing up

- Domestically, Azerbaijan will continue to target independent actors in the coming weeks until there is a reason to forge better relations with the West (e.g., the commencement of the Trump presidency and threatened energy deals with the EU).

- Internationally, Azerbaijan will continue to capitalize on uncertainty in global politics to seek regional leadership, relying on its transactional foreign policy with Russia and the EU. In doing so, the country will also test multiple narratives, the current one being “anti-colonialism,” with an aim to draw support from different segments of the international community.